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Michael Fletcher
In the last significant downturn, from 1988 to 1993,2 New 
Zealand did poorly in terms of  social policies and social 
outcomes. The result was that on some indicators, for some 
groups and in some communities the consequences of  that 
recession lasted well into this decade. Associated with this has 
been an economic cost in terms of  higher social expenditures 
and lower productivity. It may be that the current recession 
will not be as prolonged or as severe as that of  the late 
1980s–early 1990s, but it is looking increasingly likely that it 
will be. At the time of  writing the Reserve Bank is forecasting 
unemployment to peak at about 6%; other commentators are 
suggesting that the figure could be nearly 9% and many are 
talking of  a long, ‘L-shaped’ recession with a slow recovery.
In this paper I review a number of  key social indicators as 
a way of  assessing our social ‘starting point’ in comparison to 
the late 1980s. I then suggest some priorities and principles 
for social policies through the recession, before very briefly 
commenting on three key policy areas.
Where are we starting from?
Employment and unemployment
The employment rate – the percentage of  the working age 
population that is in work – is currently higher than at any 
point since the Household Labour Force Survey began in 
1986 (see Table 1). There are, however, significant differences 
between sub-groups of  the population. In particular, the 
long trend towards convergence between male and female 
employment rates means that the female employment rate, 
at 60.1%, is now significantly higher than in 1987, while the 
male rate, although it has risen in the last five years, remains 
lower than before the last recession.
In terms of  ethnicity, the most notable trend is in respect of  
Pacific. In 1987 the Pacific Islands population had the highest 
employment rate of  any of  the measured ethnic groups. Two 
decades later their employment rate is lower than that of  
Mäori and Päkehä.
Social Policies  
in the Recession1
Introduction
While we cannot prevent many of  the 
current recession’s impacts, there are real 
social policy choices open to policy makers – 
choices that can reduce its severity, influence 
who bears what costs, and, importantly, 
have an impact on the longer-term, post-
recession outcomes. How well New Zealand 
performs economically and socially in the 
years after the current recession is over will 
depend in part on how well we manage the 
distributional consequences of  the recession 
and on the social policies implemented  
during the recession.
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Table 1: Employment rates, 1987 and 2008 (%)
Sept 1987 Sept 2008*
Total 63.8 65.8
Males 75.6 71.9
Females 52.7 60.1
Päkehä 64.1 67.5
Mäori 58.6 62.5
Pacific Islands 66.2 59.6
Source: Household Labour Force Survey. *2008 ethnicity data are for June.
New Zealand has also performed well in respect of  
unemployment over the last six years: by March 2008 our 
aggregate unemployment rate, 3.6%, was among the lowest 
in the OECD. This had risen slightly to 4.2% by September 
2008. While the aggregate rate is low, for some groups rates 
are still significant. In particular, even in a very tight labour 
market, unemployment among 15–24 year olds remains 
at over 10%. Using June 2008 data,3 the Mäori rate was 
7.7% and the Pacifica rate was 6.3%, compared with a 
rate among Päkehä of  2.6%. One worrying feature of  the 
Mäori unemployment rate is that throughout the last 21 
years of  Household Labour Force Survey data, the Mäori 
unemployment rate has consistently been between 2¼ and 
2½ times the aggregate rate, irrespective of  labour market 
conditions. If  this relationship continues to hold, an increase 
in unemployment to 10% could see a quarter of  the Mäori 
labour force unemployed.
Table 2: Unemployment rates, 1987, 1991 and 2008 (%)
Sept 1987 Sept 1991 Sept 2008*
Total 4.1 10.9 4.2
Male 3.7 11.6 4.2
Female 4.7 10.1 4.1
15 – 24 yrs 7.8 17.8 10.2
Päkehä  3.3 7.6 2.6
Mäori  10.8 24.1 7.7
Pacific Islands 6.6 26.9 6.3
Source: Household Labour Force Survey. *2008 ethnicity data are for June.
A unique labour market issue that is potentially 
significant for the current recession is the very high number 
of  temporary workers currently employed in New Zealand. 
Immigration Service data show that the number of  people 
holding work permits currently in New Zealand has risen 
from approximately 30,000 in 2001 to 135,000 in June 2008. 
The great majority of  these workers have 1–3-year permits, 
and many have had their permits renewed at least once. 
Only about 5,000 or so are short-term seasonal workers. In 
principle, many of  these workers should return home when 
their permits expire if  an easing labour market means that 
there are now New Zealanders available to fill the jobs. In 
practice this is likely to depend to a significant extent on 
whether their employer wants to retain them. A further 
complication in respect of  this group is that it is unclear how 
many are counted in the Household Labour Force Survey. 
The survey is only administered to those who describe 
themselves as ‘usually resident in New Zealand’, and there is 
no information on what proportion of  work permit holders 
regard themselves this way.
Benefit numbers
One of  the starkest differences between the starting point 
for this recession and that of  the late 1980s–early 1990s is 
the situation regarding beneficiaries. In September 2008 
there were 270,000 recipients of  the four main benefits – 
unemployment, domestic purposes, invalids and sickness 
(8.4% of  the working age population). This compares with 
167,000 in 1987 (6.5% of  the working age population). 
These figures relate to the principal benefit recipient and do 
not include spouses and other family members. As at March 
2008 approximately 199,000 children were also living in 
families dependent on these benefits.4
The trend in benefit numbers is shown in Figure 1. As 
can be seen, unemployment benefit numbers have fallen 
sharply since 1999, reflecting the strong demand for labour, 
the effects of  policy initiatives and Work and Income’s 
effective case management of  job seekers. At the same time, 
the advantages of  rapid employment growth were not widely 
shared by sole parents on the domestic purposes benefit, 
whose numbers fell by only about 17,000, from a peak of  
about 113,000 to 96,000 in September 2008. This is likely to 
reflect the difficulties sole parents have in accessing affordable 
childcare and out-of-school care that fits with employment 
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Figure 1: Benefit numbers by main benefit type, 1987–2008 
Sources: Treasury long-term data series and Ministry of 
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opportunities, and suggests that the in work tax credit has 
had only a weak impact in making paid work a practicable 
option for sole parents.
Also of  concern is the continuing rise in invalids benefit 
numbers, which appear to be completely unaffected by the 
economic cycle. Invalids benefit numbers have risen 350%, 
from 23,000 in 1987 to 83,000 now. Similarly, sickness 
beneficiary numbers have increased over the same period, 
from 11,000 to 46,000. It is possible that in recent years some 
of  this increase is attributable to people transferring from 
unemployment to the sickness benefit.
The value of social assistance
Exacerbating concerns about benefit numbers is the fact that 
the real value of  most benefit incomes is now significantly 
lower than in the 1980s. Figure 2 plots the real value of  the 
core benefit entitlement plus family assistance5 from 1973 
to 2007 for a sole-parent and a two-parent family with two 
children. It shows the large fall in the 1989–91 period due to 
non-indexation and the 1991 benefit cuts, and the increase 
in assistance from 2005 due to the Working for Families 
initiatives. Notwithstanding those recent increases, the real 
value of  assistance for beneficiaries with children is still well 
below what it was in the late 1980s. 
These data do not take into account the entire social 
assistance package available to beneficiaries; in particular, 
they do not include housing assistance, to which many 
beneficiaries are entitled, or third-tier assistance. However, 
a recent Ministry of  Social Development report (Ministry of  
Social Development, 2007) showed that in 2006 beneficiaries 
with children living in accommodation supplement areas 2 
and 3 (i.e., most cities and towns in New Zealand) who had 
no other earnings had, on average, equivalised disposable 
incomes after housing costs and housing assistance of  
between 30 and 35% of  the median.6
Child poverty
On both absolute and relative measures, child poverty rose 
steeply in the recession of  the late 80s–early 90s. Following 
this, child poverty rates have trended downwards but, after 
housing costs, remain higher now than they were prior to 
1988. During the growth phase child poverty became more 
concentrated on children living in (i) households with no 
adult in work, and (ii) sole-parent households, both of  which 
groups still have child poverty rates (using the 60% of  median 
constant value absolute poverty measure) of  approximately 
50%. After housing costs, the number of  children in poverty 
in 2006/07 was between 130,000 (12%) and 230,000 (23%), 
depending on which of  the four measures represented in 
Figure 3 is used.
The extent to which New Zealand’s social assistance 
system relies on the labour market to keep children out of  
poverty is illustrated in Figure 4, which plots absolute child 
poverty against non-employment. The trend in child poverty 
follows non-employment closely, with a lag of  about 18–24 
months. While it is important not to read too much into a 
simple graphical representation like this, it is notable that 
there appears to have been only a relatively weak response 
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to the big fall in non-employment in the last three years, 
presumably reflecting the relatively high number of  sole-
parent families still reliant on benefits.
Figure 4 is, of  course, a matter of  significant concern 
for the future.  Unless we do better than in the past at 
supporting those dependent on benefits, the forecast rise in 
unemployment and decline in labour market participation 
will flow directly on to higher child poverty rates. There is 
now strong evidence of  the long-lasting individual, social 
and economic costs associated with child poverty, especially 
if  experienced by young children.7 
Household overcrowding and housing affordability
We do not have data allowing comparisons of  household 
overcrowding now and 20 years ago. However, 2006 data 
reported in The Social Report 2008 (Ministry of  Social 
Development, 2008) show 10% of  the total population and 
17% of  children under the age of  ten living in overcrowded 
accommodation, based on the Canadian overcrowding 
index. Overcrowding is much more common among the 
Pacifica population (43%) and Mäori (23%).
With respect to affordability, almost a third of  children 
and adults under the age of  45 live in households which spend 
in excess of  30% of  their disposable income on housing. The 
proportion of  those in the lowest income quintile who spend 
this much or more on housing has doubled since 1988.
Income inequality
Finally, another big difference between the present situation 
and that pertaining at the end of  the 1980s is that we are 
entering this recession with a much higher level of  income 
inequality than was the case then (see Figure 5). Income 
inequality rose more sharply in New Zealand than in any 
other OECD country over the period from the late 1980s to 
the late 1990s and remains much higher despite a slight fall 
in the most recent data.
It is not clear what will happen to income inequality in 
the next few years. It is possible that the trend will be quite 
different than in the late 1980s–early 1990s because of  
differences in the pattern of  job losses and earnings trends. 
One possibility is that the Gini co-efficient measure, which 
takes into account changes in income across the whole 
income distribution, will remain fairly flat, whilst the ratio of  
the 80th percentile to the 20th percentile worsens, reflecting 
the impact of  the recession on the less well-off  compared to 
those in the top quintile.
Social policy for the recession
In social outcome terms the comparison between now and 
the beginning of  the recession of  20 years ago is mixed. On 
the one hand, the aggregate employment rate and labour 
force participation is higher and the unemployment rate is 
similar to 1988. On the other hand, though, many of  the 
key indicators of  social well-being are significantly worse 
now compared to then. In particular, beneficiary numbers 
are much higher and beneficiary incomes significantly lower. 
Child poverty rates, though lower than in the mid-1990s, are 
still higher after housing costs than in the 1980s, and income 
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inequality is much greater than it was 20 years ago.
The second part of  this article draws on the experiences 
of  the late 1980s–early 1990s to suggest some principles and 
priorities that should guide social policy in the recession, 
and then very briefly discusses three key policy areas – 
employment policies, education and training, and social 
assistance and family tax credits.
The importance of focusing on distributional impacts
The ‘severity’ and ‘duration’ of  a recession are both averages. 
For some people there will be no recession at all. For others, 
income losses will be large and will last long after the recession 
is statistically over. In the last major recession, certain groups 
experienced long and substantial hardship. 
These groups can be identified by industry 
or occupation, ethnicity, education level, 
or in some cases the community or town 
they lived in. The situation then was 
exacerbated by policy settings based on 
a belief  that labour markets would adjust 
more rapidly than they did and that 
aggregate losses would be minimised by 
allowing that adjustment to occur without 
too much intervention.
One likely difference between this 
recession and that of  1988–93 is that then the downturn 
was associated with a process of  economic restructuring 
that was a strong factor in determining the distributional 
impacts, particularly in respect of  employment losses. This 
time, despite the global financial crisis and the probable 
need to restructure or re-regulate global financial practices, 
it is less likely to result in much restructuring of  the New 
Zealand economy, in the sense of  significant shifts in 
output or employment shares. This suggests that it is even 
more important to maintain, as far as possible, the existing 
human capital and skills of  the workforce and to avoid the 
extremely high rates of  unemployment and poverty and loss 
of  infrastructure that occurred in many New Zealand towns 
in the late 80s–early 90s.
Prioritise the least well-off and children, where the long-term 
social and economic costs are greatest
In seeking to ameliorate the negative impacts of  the recession, 
policy makers must aim for some balance between cushioning 
the effects on those who experience the biggest shocks to 
their income and/or wealth, and protecting those who are 
least well-off. There is a risk that too much of  the former 
results in middle-class capture of  the available assistance. 
Quite aside from arguments of  equity and social justice, the 
experience of  the 1990s and since is strong evidence of  the 
long-term consequences of  not ensuring adequate support 
for the poorest communities and for children in low-income 
households. 
Be aware of the long-term impacts of policy changes on the social 
policy framework
Some policies introduced to counter the effects of  the 
recession are reversible – they can either be easily ended 
when no longer needed, or automatically phased out when 
circumstances improve. As a result they have no lasting 
effect on the structure or mix of  social policies and welfare 
provisions. Others do, however, have long-term implications 
for the overall social policy framework. The 1991 benefit cuts, 
for example, have never been reversed, despite the evidence 
of  income inadequacy among beneficiaries.
Another example of  this issue is the ‘Restart’ package to 
assist those who are made redundant that was announced by 
the government on 15 December 2008. Pre-election versions 
of  this package proposed by both major parties could 
potentially have introduced into the New Zealand welfare 
system elements of  a two-tier social insurance/safety net 
structure, where those with a work history receive a period of  
higher assistance than those without and do not face the same 
asset tests or spousal income tests. It is, of  course, a matter 
of  legitimate debate as to whether a single-tier system, such 
as New Zealand has always had, is or is not preferable to the 
two-tier social insurance model common in much of  Europe. 
The point here is that there was a risk that a measure brought 
in with the intention of  alleviating income shocks affecting 
people made redundant would result in a quite fundamental 
long-term change to the social security framework without 
the implications of  that change being properly debated.
As it turns out, the government’s package appears for the 
most part to have avoided that risk. The extra assistance is 
largely targeted at helping those without significant savings 
or other income, and who face high child-related or housing 
costs to adjust to the loss of  earned income. On the other 
hand, the package provides only limited assistance and will 
not help many people affected by the downturn.
Some brief comments on three specific policy areas
It is beyond the scope of  this article to fully discuss each of  
these areas, but the following are some brief  comments based 
largely on what we know from past outcomes.
Employment support
The extent to which employment levels can be maintained 
will have a long-lasting impact on subsequent social and 
economic outcomes. Maintaining jobs through a generalised 
and protracted recessionary period is, of  course, not easy. 
Attempts to sustain existing jobs through direct employer 
subsidies may be useful in some targeted situations, but do 
not have a good track record, owing largely to deadweight 
cost problems and the difficulties of  determining which 
The ‘severity’ and ‘duration’ of a recession 
are both averages. For some people there 
will be no recession at all. For others, income 
losses will be large and will last long after the 
recession is statistically over. 
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jobs should be supported. Clearly, demand-side measures 
can help; as will government infrastructure projects (which 
should include social infrastructure such as state house 
building, etc). 
In terms of  employment programmes for the unemployed, 
the evaluation evidence from the 1990s showed that wage 
subsidies for full-time/permanent employment (eg, Job Plus) 
worked relatively well, while ‘work-readiness’ and work-
for-dole schemes such as Community Taskforce were not 
effective in increasing people’s chance of  getting back into 
employment. Temporary full-time, full-wage, project-based 
programmes such as Taskforce Green can be beneficial, 
depending on the project and the quality of  administration. 
One advantage we have now compared with 20 years ago is 
the considerable improvement in Work and Income’s case 
management processes and in its links with employers and 
communities at the local level. 
The issue of  targeting of  employment assistance will 
need further analysis. During the 1980s and 1990s, active 
labour market assistance was targeted mostly at the long-
term unemployed (defined in most cases as 26 weeks-plus 
duration on the job seeker register). The relationship between 
inflows, outflows and duration means that in the early stages 
at least, when unemployment numbers will be dominated by 
new enrolments, a focus on long duration makes little sense. 
Even later, as the proportion of  long-term unemployed 
grows, it may be better to target other characteristics. Males 
over 40 years old, for example, are at a higher risk of  long-
term unemployment than are young people, who tend to 
experience more, shorter spells out of  work. Given what 
we know of  the impact of  poverty on children, it may also 
make sense to focus on those with dependent children, and 
especially young children.
Training and education programmes
Past experience shows that short-term training courses, such 
as ACCESS, Mäori ACCESS and the Training Opportunity 
Programme (TOP), are not very effective either in raising 
participants’ skill levels or in enhancing their subsequent 
employment chances. It would be better to put considerable 
money into subsidising longer-term education and training 
opportunities of  the sort that lead to meaningful skill 
acquisition and recognised qualifications. Even in a downturn 
in demand for many trades and similar services, there will be 
opportunities to subsidise modern apprenticeship places in 
many occupations. In addition to the benefits to those taking 
up apprenticeships, such a policy would ensure that a good 
supply of  skilled workers is available when demand picks 
up.
There is scope, too, to expand access to the training 
incentive allowance which helps beneficiaries with tertiary 
education, including university study.
Benefits and tax credits
Benefit rates are lower than they were in the 1980s and 
entitlements are below what is necessary for many beneficiaries 
to avoid poverty and significant hardship. Notwithstanding 
worsening government accounts, there is a strong case for 
raising benefit levels to ensure the recession does not result in 
the same rapid increase in child and adult poverty that New 
Zealand experienced in the 1990s. In that period, the long-
term effects on the individuals affected and on wider social 
and economic outcomes were clear.
As well as increasing core rates of  benefit, it 
would help to adopt an indexing regime similar 
to that used for New Zealand Superannuation 
– annual CPI adjustments within a band linked 
to average wages. The effect of  this would be to 
constrain benefit rate increases if  the recession 
results in falling real wages, while at the same 
time ensuring that over the long term benefits 
maintain relativity with wages.
Accommodation supplement (AS) maxima 
also need increasing – and could perhaps be 
increased ahead of  benefit rates as an interim, 
more targeted measure. The proportion of  AS recipients 
who have reached the maximum has been increasing steadily 
and is now over 30%. The government’s ‘Replace’ assistance 
to those made redundant is a limited step in this direction, 
albeit available to only a very narrow group of  AS recipients 
and for only a short period of  time.
Weak labour demand accentuates the case for revising 
aspects of  the Working for Families package. The package 
– which undoubtedly provided substantial, much-needed 
assistance for many families – was designed to take advantage 
of  a strong labour market by encouraging beneficiaries 
with children to move off  benefits and into paid work. In 
circumstances of  falling employment, components of  the 
package such as the in-work tax credit are unlikely to have 
any effect in reducing unemployment. A further difficulty 
with the in-work tax credit is that it is not well targeted as a 
‘make work pay’ measure, since most of  the expenditure goes 
to those higher up the income distribution, for whom the gap 
between wages and benefits is not relevant. 
In a situation of  falling employment and rising benefit 
dependence it would be preferable to remove the in-work 
tax credit and transfer the expenditure to an increase in the 
core family tax credit. At the same time it would be possible 
to simplify the current five family tax credit rates (which are 
largely historical accidents) in such a way as to give relatively 
more of  the additional expenditure to families with young 
children. Poverty in the early years is known to be most likely 
A further difficulty with the in-work tax credit 
is that it is not well targeted as a ‘make work 
pay’ measure, since most of the expenditure 
goes to those higher up the income distribution 
...
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to have lasting detrimental effects, and, in addition, it is when 
children are young that families tend to have the greatest 
financial difficulties.
Conclusions
New Zealand is entering what appears likely to be a serious 
and protracted recession with a mixed set of  social indicators. 
While employment is high and unemployment low, the 
number of  people dependent on benefits is considerably 
higher than at the beginning of  the last significant downturn, 
and the incomes of  beneficiaries are lower. Income inequality 
is also much higher than it was 20 years ago.
The experience of  the 1990s suggests that, quite apart 
from arguments of  social justice, a deliberate policy focus on 
expenditures to minimise the impacts of  the recession on the 
most vulnerable, and especially on children, will significantly 
improve New Zealand’s social and economic indicators after 
the recession is over. This article touches on only a small 
number of  the range of  policy initiatives needed to achieve 
this. 
 1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Institute of Policy Studies symposium 
‘New Zealand Economic and Social Policy in the Face of the Global Crisis’, held on 22 
November 2008.
 2 Technically that recession was over a much shorter period, but the period of low 
employment growth and high unemployment lasted that long.
3 Consistent September quarter data are not available as Statistics New Zealand has 
changed its ethnicity classifications from a hierarchical method to a multiple-response 
method. Backdated data using the new system are expected to be available shortly. 
4 I do not have September 2008 data or a comparable figure for the 1980s.
5 Family benefit, family care, family support and family tax credit.
6 The minority with some earnings in addition to their benefit had incomes averaging about 
43% of the median.
7 See, for example, Hirsh, 2006 and Poulton et al., 2002.
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The growth of the Pacific communities in 
New Zealand has fundamentally changed 
our relations with the island countries of 
the Pacific, and it nudges us to think about 
Pasifika in a different way. It is not a new idea 
that Pacific Island countries are important 
to New Zealand – that has been a theme 
in our foreign policy because of colonial 
relationships and the continuing associations, 
constitutional and other, that survived them; 
because of trade and tourism; and because 
of geography. 
The point of departure for Pacific 
Interactions: Pasifika in New Zealand, New 
Zealand in Pasifika is the shift in the nature of 
our relationship with Pasifika that more than 
50 years of immigration has brought about. At 
the end of the Second World War the Pacific 
community in New Zealand was around 
2,000. By the 2006 census, it numbered 
just under 266,000, or around 7% of the 
population – large enough to be significant 
in our economy, our politics and our culture.  
This reflection on the relationships between 
New Zealand and its Pacific neighbourhood 
stems from the realisation that Pasifika is 
here in New Zealand and that its presence 
here is an essential element in the way in 
which New Zealand and Pasifika interact.
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